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Private Solutions to Public Disasters
Self-Reliance and Social Resilience
Peter J. Boettke
Daniel J. Smith
 George Mason University
. . . What has so often excited wonder [is] the great rapidity with 
which countries recover from a state of devastation; the disap-
pearance, in a short time, of all traces of the mischiefs done by 
earthquakes, fl oods, hurricanes, and the ravages of war. An enemy 
lays waste a country by fi re and sword, and destroys or carries 
away nearly all the moveable wealth existing in it: all the inhabit-
ants are ruined, and yet in a few years after, everything is much as 
it was before.
—John Stuart Mill (1848)
It is often in the aftermath of the worst calamities of nature and war 
that the power of human ingenuity and resilience is most clearly dem-
onstrated. John Stuart Mill, writing in 1848, noted that observers were 
frequently amazed at the rapidity with which inhabitants of a devastated 
area were able to recover. It is at the very time when public and private 
infrastructure and formal institutions are at their weakest—following a 
public disaster—that civil society would be expected to collapse. Yet 
calamity after calamity has demonstrated the resounding ability of pri-
vate actors to coordinate recoveries from the most severe of crises.
Unfortunately, not all catastrophes are followed by rapid or even 
complete recoveries. Slow or incomplete recoveries are attributable in 
part to the uncontrollable features of the disaster, such as its magnitude 
or its particular form. Mill argued that large-scale destruction of hu-
man capital hinders recovery because local knowledge is essential in 
coordinating a rapid recovery. A more important factor, especially for 
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economists and policymakers, is the presence of institutional features 
that can signifi cantly impede the natural tendency of unfettered people 
to achieve a complete and rapid recovery following a disaster.
Profi t-seeking entrepreneurs are vital to any recovery process. En-
trepreneurs must be able to unrestrictedly allocate resources to their 
most urgent employments, as expressed by customers through prices. 
Any interference with the structure of prices distorts the signals that 
entrepreneurs receive, misdirecting or hampering their efforts. Misal-
location of resources can literally be a matter of life and death in the 
immediate aftermath of a natural disaster or war. Price ceilings dampen 
the ability of profi ts to induce increased supply of needed goods and 
services, and they distort the ability of prices to signal consumers to 
ration and economize scarce resources. Poor policy unnecessarily 
blocks and inhibits the labor and capital adjustments necessary for a 
complete and timely recovery by distorting entrepreneurial calculation 
and preventing entrepreneurs from allocating resources to their most 
productive uses.
Despite the interference of regulations and uncertainty brought 
about by government action, humankind has demonstrated a remark-
able resilience following a natural or man-made disaster. We argue that 
this is due to the civilizing and coordinating roles played by civil soci-
ety. For-profi t companies, charities, and churches play a vital role in the 
recovery process. These organizations have proven to be the fi rst and 
the best-equipped responders to disasters, jump-starting the recovery 
process.
COMPOUNDING NATURE’S FURY WITH HUMAN FOLLY
Humankind has shown an amazing resilience when it comes to 
overcoming nature’s fury. Yet when nature’s fury is compounded with 
human folly, this resilience may suffer, eroded by corruption, signal dis-
tortions, and regime uncertainty. Ironically, it is often well-intentioned 
people who create the folly that magnifi es nature’s fury due to a misun-
derstanding of the way incentives affect human behavior.
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We use the case of Hurricane Katrina to show what types of institu-
tions and policies are robust to natural disasters, allowing for maximum 
speed and totality of recovery. We show how natural disasters can 
magnify the adverse effects of poor institutions and policies already in 
place. Hurricane Katrina hit Louisiana in August 2005, causing over 
$100 billion in property damage and 1,800 deaths (Chamlee-Wright 
and Rothschild 2007), making it one of the worst natural disasters to 
ever hit the United States. This destruction has been amplifi ed by poli-
cies already in place, such as fl ood insurance and a corrupt levee board; 
by policies in the immediate aftermath, such as excessive layers of 
regulation; and in the long term through the creation of instability and 
uncertainty for investors.
Even though entrepreneurs were burdened with excessive and in-
hibiting regulations and poor policy, civil society was still able to show 
an amazing resilience in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Corpora-
tions like Wal-Mart and Home Depot, as well as small businesses like 
gas stations, were able to respond quickly to the devastation, providing 
necessary goods and services that would allow more businesses and 
residents to come back to New Orleans. Profi t-seeking entrepreneurs 
and private charities and churches played a central coordinating role in 
the aftermath of Katrina.
Pre-Katrina
The Army Corps of Engineers was entrusted with overseeing and 
constructing levees around Louisiana after the Great Flood of 1927, 
though the federal government had been overseeing the levees since 
creating the Mississippi River Commission in 1879 (Davis 2000). 
The Army Corps of Engineers was caught in confl icting layers of bu-
reaucracy, primarily between the demands and desires of the federal 
government and the local citizens and politicians of Louisiana.
Three years prior to Katrina, McQuaid and Schleifstein (2002) is-
sued a report concluding that New Orleans’s inadequate levees would 
not withstand a direct hit by a hurricane (Horne 2006). John Barry 
(1998) wrote a book detailing the history of the Mississippi Flood of 
1927, especially focusing on the failures of the Army Corps of Engi-
neers and local politicians to take fl ood control seriously. John McPhee 
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(1989) wrote a book detailing how the levees would eventually fail; Eric 
Berger, a science journalist, reported on the devastation that a direct hit 
on New Orleans would cause (Berger 2001; Brinkley 2006). Despite 
such warnings from these and other experts, no substantial measures 
were taken to fortify the weakened and often ill-constructed levees (van 
Heerdon and Bryan 2006). When Katrina hit, the Army Corps of Engi-
neers was managing a largely dilapidated system of levees insuffi cient 
to stand up to a storm of the magnitude of Katrina. Not only did the 
levees lack structural integrity, but the construction was also persis-
tently behind schedule: upgrades had been pushed back as long as 13 
years, leaving one section of fl ood work still unfi nished when Katrina 
hit (Horne 2006).
The poor state of the levees was primarily due to the corruption on 
the levee board.1 Adamantly and successfully resisting the advice of the 
Army Corps of Engineers, the levee board fortifi ed frontal protection 
for the levees instead of focusing on an extensive network of pumps up 
to several miles inland (Horne 2006). This frontal protection—a sys-
tem of fl oodgates—came in at one-third the cost of the favored pump 
and levee arrangement. However, it required continuous maintenance 
by the levee board, a task board members were not willing to commit 
themselves to.
Local politicians were able to funnel federal money earmarked for 
levee renovation and construction to benefi t special-interest groups. The 
shipping industry successfully lobbied for harbor upgrades and canal 
dredging projects from this federal money, both projects that actually 
increased the chances of hurricane damage (Brinkley 2006). In addi-
tion, local politicians who controlled the Levee Board and the Sewage 
and Water Board resisted undertaking costly and unpopular but highly 
recommended projects in order to bolster voter support by devoting 
resources to more immediate problems facing New Orleans, such as 
corruption, schooling, and urban infrastructure problems (Brinkley 
2006; Cooper and Block 2006).
With the levees standing 14 feet above the average water level of 
Lake Pontchartrain, locals believed themselves safe as long as the city 
pumps were working to take care of any spillovers. This belief, how-
ever, was predicated on the assumption that the levees would hold up. 
Charitable organizations, such as the Red Cross, were aware of the dan-
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ger that a large storm posed to these insuffi cient levees and refused 
to operate within the fl ood zone. The condition of the levees was bad 
enough that a signifi cant number of the personnel in charge of managing 
the levees evacuated prior to the storm, leaving the levees understaffed 
(Horne 2006). Though the initial break in the levee was only 20 feet 
and could have been shored up with the heavy equipment and sandbags 
owned by the levee agency, levee employees did not respond and the 
break turned into a 200-foot gap.
While local politicians were shirking their duty to maintain the 
system of levees, state and federal government offi cials were actively 
encouraging homeowners and businesses to reside in the disaster-prone 
areas threatened by the dilapidated levees. Subsidized fl ood insurance 
and the expectation of postdisaster relief brought about what econo-
mists call moral hazard problems in disaster-prone areas. Moral hazard 
problems occur when people are protected from incurring the full cost 
of their choices and thus make worse and more costly decisions than 
they would absent such protection. Lowering the cost of residing in 
areas with high fl ood and wind risk artifi cially increases the number of 
people and the amount of property in disaster-prone areas (Sutter 2008). 
In an unmolested market, increased insurance rates and the expectation 
of incurring storm damages would force residents to account for and 
bear the cost of living in disaster-prone areas.
Furthermore, state governments have been notoriously resistant to 
letting insurance companies mandate mitigation efforts by customers 
in these high-risk areas. When cost-effective preventive measures are 
necessary in order to obtain insurance, an incentive exists to build more 
structurally sound buildings. Even such simple measures as install-
ing window shutters can signifi cantly reduce the probability of wind 
damage.
State governments interfere with insurance companies’ risk assess-
ments and premiums for various types of mitigation in two ways. First, 
several states in disaster-prone areas require state approval of mitiga-
tion discounts, allowing competing insurance companies and politically 
motivated elected offi cials to second-guess insurance companies’ de-
cisions. Second, some states, such as Louisiana, Florida, and North 
Carolina, require discounts for certain mitigation practices. Since in-
surance companies already have the incentives to offer discounts for 
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effective mitigation practices, government interference, when binding, 
requires allocation of resources to mitigation measures that have not 
been proven effective. Laws that require insurance companies to fund 
sham mitigation practices stem from political favors both to interested 
parties and to genuinely concerned politicians who do not have a full 
understanding of insurance markets.
New Orleans’s long tradition of special-interest legislation, in 
addition to leading to poor levee maintenance and construction, also 
shackled entrepreneurs’ abilities to respond to consumers’ needs in 
the wake of the havoc created by Katrina. In postdisaster recoveries, 
such restrictions prove extraordinarily burdensome for two primary 
reasons. First, the bureaucratic process of applying for permits, inspec-
tions, and assistance is especially diffi cult when many public buildings 
are damaged and public employees displaced. Filling out the paper-
work required for engaging in various forms of business activities is 
a daunting process even when public infrastructure is not shut down 
or understaffed. Second, as John Stuart Mill pointed out, the return of 
people with local human capital is essential to the recovery process. En-
trepreneurs, vital for recovery, may become frustrated by a complicated 
bureaucratic process and may simply choose to not return following a 
disaster. At best, regulatory processes only slow down and prevent en-
trepreneurs from putting their human capital to immediate use. In order 
to attract residents and other business owners back to the affected areas, 
an initial set of enterprising business owners must return and provide 
basic goods and services. Residents and other business owners waiting 
for these basic goods and services to be available before returning are, 
over time, more likely to establish themselves in the cities they took 
refuge in, making it costlier to return.
Occupational licensing, granted to construction unions to artifi cially 
increase wages, restricted construction experts from other states from 
setting up shop in the disaster-stricken areas to jump-start the rebuild-
ing process. The six-month waiting period mandated for a construction 
permit was not rescinded in the wake of the damage created by Katrina. 
To its credit, the city of New Orleans did suspend inspections on con-
struction projects, allowing, for instance, carpenters and electricians to 
inspect their own work. Historic preservation regulations also inhibited 
rebuilding in New Orleans. Draconian preservation laws were applied 
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in historic districts, making it diffi cult for contractors to quickly rebuild 
and restore historic buildings affected by severe fl ooding.
Preexisting restrictions on the adult-to-child ratio for child care 
centers were also not relaxed following the storm (Chamlee-Wright 
2008a). To initiate progress toward recovery, entrepreneurs and busi-
ness owners needed places offering care and supervision for their 
children. Even two years after Katrina hit, only 94 of 275 day care cen-
ters in New Orleans had reopened. With so many damaged buildings 
and missing employees, the adult-to-child capacity restrictions meant 
that many parents were unable to focus completely on recovery efforts. 
The numerous residents who fl ed with their children to cities such as 
Houston and Atlanta found it hard to take on full-time employment due 
to similar restrictions in those cities.
Zoning regulations and building codes also shackled entrepre-
neurs in their efforts to speedily reopen stores to offer basic services 
and goods. The opening of a health clinic was delayed by nearly six 
months because it was located in a residential zone and had building 
code violations such as a handicap ramp with hand rails on only one 
side. Similarly, a laundry had to wait weeks for an inspection after the 
building was completed and ready to open up.
Layers of regulation and profi t windfalls from postdisaster re-
lief create an institutional environment ripe for corruption. In 2004, 
Louisiana was ranked fortieth out of 50 states in the Pacifi c Research 
Institute’s Economic Freedom of the States Index (Huang, McCormick, 
and McQuillan 2004) and had relatively high costs of conducting busi-
ness compared to other states. In addition, Louisiana was ranked the 
third most corrupt state in the nation in 2004 (Corporate Crime Reporter 
2004).
During Katrina
The folly already in place prior to Katrina, which drastically in-
creased the amount of damage the storm caused, was also compounded 
with folly during the storm and its immediate aftermath. While most 
economists are familiar with the concept of the tragedy of the commons, 
a term coined by the biologist Garrett Hardin, most are not familiar with 
the tragedy of the anticommons. The tragedy of the anticommons oc-
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curs when several government agencies have the ability to regulate and 
control a common area, creating unnecessary, and often repetitive and 
even confl icting, layers of bureaucracy. Additional layers of bureau-
cracy, especially following a disaster, can cost lives by slowing down 
the response times of entrepreneurs. In addition, complicated layers of 
bureaucracy, especially when combined with political windfalls from 
disaster relief, drastically increase the chances of venality.
The relief efforts for Hurricane Katrina orchestrated by FEMA have 
been notoriously plagued by corruption and abuse. In fact, according 
to the Government Accountability Offi ce, the cost of corruption and 
abuse for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita could reach $1.4 billion (Kutz 
and Ryan 2006). In a study on natural disasters and corruption, Leeson 
and Sobel (2008) found that every additional $1 per capita spent on 
disaster relief by FEMA increases corruption in the average state by up 
to 2.5 percent, due to the windfalls created by the programs. This sug-
gests that the states along the Gulf Coast might be notoriously corrupt 
precisely because they are frequently hit by natural disasters. Leeson 
and Sobel estimate that eliminating FEMA disaster relief would reduce 
corruption by more than 20 percent in the average state. In a separate ar-
ticle, Leeson and Sobel (2007) trace the origins of the corruption to the 
time-sensitive nature of disaster relief; increased oversight shows little 
promise in curbing this corruption because, in their words, “protocol 
will take a backseat when disasters actually strike.”
When infrastructure and normal modes of communicating and or-
ganizing activity are slow, incomplete, and impeded by interference 
following a public disaster, the need to allow market prices to adjust 
to communicate information to the relevant actors becomes even more 
important. Hayek (1945) discusses the heavily dispersed nature of 
knowledge and the importance of a freely fl uctuating price system as 
the most effi cient system to coordinate economic activity across an ar-
ray of activities because of its ability to convey the specifi c knowledge 
of time and place to the relevant economic actors. With so many needs 
after a natural disaster, it is diffi cult, especially for an altruistic gov-
ernment agent operating in the fi eld, to decide whose and what needs 
should be met fi rst. Sobel and Leeson (2007) fi nd that while private 
actors are able to respond to transient, decentralized information in a 
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timely manner following a disaster, public offi cials are forced to make 
decisions with, at best, scanty and outdated information.
Price controls following a disaster are known for distorting price 
signals, which is counterproductive at a time when those signals are 
most needed to coordinate the allocation of resources to their most 
urgent employment. William Carden (2009) noted that emergency situ-
ations are inherently chaotic and that a well-functioning unmolested 
price system can signifi cantly reduce the chaos. Price ceilings discour-
age economical consumption and take away the profi t-seeking motive 
for entrepreneurs to fi nd innovative ways of allocating resources where 
the demand is highest.
Post-Katrina
Continuous government interference in the market, policy rever-
sals, and varying responses to disasters create uncertainty for market 
actors. This uncertainty may inhibit entrepreneurial investment in 
current profi t opportunities. Robert Higgs (1997) calls this process in 
which government adversely affects investment by not credibly adher-
ing to a set policy regime uncertainty. In the aftermath of a disaster, the 
stymieing effect of regime uncertainty on investment is magnifi ed, as it 
paralyzes the entrepreneurship and investment necessary for a full and 
rapid recovery. Market actors, left in the dark concerning the nature and 
timing of goods and services to be provided by government agencies, 
cut back on much-needed investment. Government regulations, such 
as price controls, distort the signaling process and prevent the market 
adjustment that is at the very heart of economic effi ciency.
By focusing on standard postdisaster recovery procedures, public 
offi cials disregarded the necessary role of private actors in the recov-
ery process (Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2008a). Focusing on procuring 
more federal dollars, imposing stronger regulations, and periodically 
implementing new recovery plans, policymakers intruded on the recov-
ery process, preventing entrepreneurs from rapidly returning to their 
businesses. In a structured set of neutral interviews, residents named 
barriers erected by government policies and programs, in particular 
those intended to assist redevelopment, as the biggest challenge they 
had faced since returning (Chamlee-Wright and Storr 2007).
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Despite these needless barriers, entrepreneurs exercised persistence 
and creativity to coordinate the start of a recovery. Population estimates 
for the New Orleans MSA show that its total population reached 86 
percent of pre-Katrina levels by July of 2008 (GNOCDC 2008), as 
shown in Table 5.1.2 Although the area remains far short of a full re-
covery, especially in the parishes most severely hit by Katrina, the data 
nonetheless refl ects an impressive display of resiliency. This resilience, 
however, is largely due to private-sector responses, and not formulaic 
public-sector responses (Boettke et al. 2007). In fact, those areas where 
public-sector infl uence undermined private-sector response times show 
the least recovery progress.
SELF-RELIANCE AND SOCIAL RESILIENCE
According to Nobel Laureate Thomas Schelling, the primary prob-
lem residents of New Orleans faced in the recovery process was that of 
coordinating expectations (Gosselin 2005). If residents expected people 
to come back and work to bring about a recovery, then they would. On 
the other hand, if residents did not expect others to come back, they in 
fact would not come back, and the human capital necessary for recov-
ery would never materialize. Private corporations, such as Wal-Mart 
and Home Depot, and determined small business owners were able to 
solve Schelling’s coordination problem by being the fi rst movers. By 
quickly getting their stores reopened and their employees back in town, 
these businesses were able to provide the basic goods and services that 
were necessary for other residents and business owners to come back to 
New Orleans as well.
Through in-depth interviews she conducted in New Orleans, Emily 
Chamlee-Wright (2007; 2008b) found that private actors played a large 
role in coordinating a recovery through mutual assistance, commer-
cial cooperation, and private reestablishment of community resources. 
Residents with house damage and business owners who found their 
stores damaged or looted would not have been able to return immedi-
ately after Katrina to jump-start the recovery process without mutual 
assistance. Returning residents were able to coordinate a return with 
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Jefferson Orleans Plaquemines St. Bernard St. Charles St. John St. Tammany Total
July 2005 450,848 455,046 28,565 64,890 50,116 45,568 217,367 1,312,400
July 2006 422,222 210,768 21,610 13,924 51,868 47,647 223,863 991,902
July 2007 440,339 288,113 21,597 33,439 51,892 47,678 226,263 1,109,411
July 2008 436,181 311,853 21,276 37,722 51,547 46,994 228,456 1,134,029
Table 5.1  Population by Parish, New Orleans (LA) MSA
SOURCE: GNOCDC (2008).
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others by committing to exchanging their different skills and remaining 
resources. A lumber store owner was able to trade room in his largely 
undamaged house for assistance in rebuilding his store, which had been 
badly damaged and looted. Chamlee-Wright also found that commer-
cial entities showed novel and extensive cooperation with each other in 
order to signal to evacuees that New Orleans would recover and that ba-
sic goods and services would be available to returning residents looking 
to start the recovery process. Companies were willing to offer harder-
hit companies generous terms of credit and even free supplies in order 
to help these other businesses open up to attract more residents back. 
Churches, such as the Mary Queen of Vietnam Catholic Church, were 
able to reestablish community services vital for attracting back the local 
knowledge necessary for a complete and timely recovery.
The Doux-Commerce Thesis, put forth by the Scottish Enlighten-
ment thinkers, holds that commerce plays a key role in civil society: it 
is the very act of trading that civilizes a society. Through the process of 
exchange we fi nd mutually benefi cial margins that encourage coopera-
tion, and seeking to establish an honest reputation to facilitate future 
transactions gives business owners and their customers a motive to ex-
hibit desirable moral traits. In the chaotic aftermath of a disaster like 
Katrina, this civilizing role of reestablishing commerce is necessary for 
the recovery process.
Although hindered by policies that exacerbated the toll of Katrina, 
private companies and organizations undertook efforts that signifi cantly 
eased the severity of the disaster. Horwitz (2009) found that big-box 
retailers, such as Wal-Mart and Home Depot, operating under the 
knowledge-generating and incentive-inducing infl uences of competi-
tion, were able to respond signifi cantly faster than FEMA. The private 
companies managed to get supplies to where they were needed almost 
directly following the storm. Before Hurricane Katrina even made land-
fall, both chains had preemptively placed trucks, drivers, and supplies 
at strategic staging points, out of danger but close enough to rush in sup-
plies right after the storm passed. Wal-Mart, using its effi cient supply 
chain, was able to get all but 15 of 89 damaged stores up and running 
within 10 days, supplying needed items to Katrina survivors. Within the 
fi rst three weeks after the storm hit, Wal-Mart delivered almost 2,500 
truckloads of supplies to the affected areas, while Home Depot deliv-
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ered over 800 truckloads. Both organizations left local store managers 
with discretion so they could respond to local emergency situations. 
Several Wal-Mart managers were commended for providing free sup-
plies to devastated survivors of the storm.
Churches and private charity organizations also played an important 
role in the recovery process following Hurricane Katrina. Chamlee-
Wright and Storr (2008b, 2009) do an in-depth cultural analysis of a 
Vietnamese-American community in New Orleans East, fi nding that 
the Mary Queen of Vietnam Catholic Church played a central role in the 
revival of the neighborhood surrounding the church. One of the most 
surprising features of their study is that the church is located in one of 
the most damaged areas of New Orleans, one that the Urban Land Insti-
tute claimed had little chance of recovery. Within a few weeks after the 
storm, parishioners were returning and taking the initial steps towards 
recovery. An astounding 90 percent of the residents around the church 
had returned by summer 2007, and 70 of the 75 Vietnamese-owned area 
businesses were up and running. Even compared to less-damaged areas, 
this was a remarkable recovery.
CONCLUSION
The destruction and upheaval caused by nature’s fury are often 
staggering. Throughout history, unfettered people have been able to 
overcome the worst tragedies of nature and war, displaying the amazing 
resilience and ingenuity of humankind. However, when governments 
impede the very process that allows the rapidity and completeness of 
recovery, civil society must overcome human folly as well as nature’s 
fury. Placing additional regulatory obstacles and destabilizing programs 
in the way of entrepreneurs severely compromises the ability of private 
actors to coordinate a complete and rapid recovery.
It was civil society that forged the way in coordinating a post-
Katrina recovery. Entrepreneurs were able to overcome the obstacles 
created by the hurricane itself and by problematic government regu-
lation in order to provide the basic goods and services necessary to 
jump-start the recovery process. It was the initial commitments under-
boettke.indd   99 5/25/2010   1:34:30 PM
100   Boettke and Smith
taken by businesses and private organizations, as well as the civilizing 
infl uence of the reestablishment of commerce, that attracted residents 
back to New Orleans, demonstrating, once again, the amazing resil-
ience of civil society in overcoming nature’s fury.
Notes
1. This corruption persisted even after Katrina hit, when the levee board president 
used the tragedy of Katrina to hand out lucrative contracts to family members, 
including his wife’s cousin and her son, and even cut himself a check that was 
$98,000 above the normal stipend (Horne 2006).
2. The parishes of Jefferson, Orleans, and Plaquemines dispute the 2008 fi gures, 
claiming that the U.S. Census Bureau has understated these numbers (GNOCDC 
2008). If undisputed 2007 fi gures are used instead of the 2008 fi gures, then the 
total population of the New Orleans MSA had reached 85 percent of pre-Katrina 
levels by July 2007.
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